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Abstract		
A	common	objection	to	both	contextualism	and	relativism	about	knowledge	
ascriptions	is	that	they	threaten	knowledge	norms	of	assertion	and	action.	
Consequently,	if	there	is	good	reason	to	accept	knowledge	norms	of	assertion	or	
action,	there	is	good	reason	to	reject	both	contextualism	and	relativism.	In	this	
paper	we	argue	that	neither	contextualism	nor	relativism	threaten	knowledge	
norms	of	assertion	or	action.	
	
0. Introduction	
Contextualists	about	knowledge	ascriptions	think	the	truth-values	of	claims	of	the	form	
“S	knows	that	p”	depend	on	the	context	of	the	ascriber	(DeRose	2009).	In	contrast,	
relativists	think	the	truth-values	of	such	claims	depend	on	the	context	of	the	assessor	
(MacFarlane	2005).	What	both	views	have	in	common	is	the	idea	that	the	truth-values	of	
knowledge	ascriptions	are	indexed	to	perspectives,	whether	of	the	ascriber	or	assessor.	
So	contextualism	and	relativism	are	both	versions	of	‘perspectivalism’:	
PERSPECTIVALISM:	Where	S	is	some	subject,	p	some	proposition,	and	i	some	
perspective,	“S	knows	p”	is	true	at	perspective	i	iff	(a)	p	is	true	(b)	S	believes	p	(c)	S’s	
epistemic	position	with	respect	to	p	satisfies	the	epistemic	standards	employed	in	i.	
This	paper	focuses	on	‘non-subject-centred’	perspectivalism,	according	to	which	the	
relevant	perspective	is	either	that	of	whoever	utters	the	knowledge	ascription	
(contextualism)	or	that	of	whoever	assesses	it	(relativism).	Henceforth,	by	
‘perspectivalism’	we	mean	non-subject-centred	perspectivalism.	
Many	think	there	are	strong	ties	between	knowledge,	assertion,	and	action	(Hawthorne	
&	Stanley	2008;	Williamson	2000).	A	common	objection	to	perspectivalism	is	that	it	
threatens	these	ties	(Hawthorne	2004).	If	there	is	good	reason	to	think	there	are	such	
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ties,	there	is	good	reason	to	reject	perspectivalism.1	Against	this	common	objection,	we	
will	argue	that	perspectivalists	can	maintain	the	ties	between	knowledge,	assertion,	and	
action.	First,	we	explain	the	problem	(§1).	Second,	we	look	at	two	approaches:	the	
‘semantic’	approach	and	the	‘pragmatic’	approach	(§2-3).	We	argue	that,	while	the	
semantic	approach	may	reduce	the	scope	of	the	problem,	we	need	to	adopt	a	version	of	
the	pragmatic	approach	if	we	want	to	address	it	fully.	Finally,	we	deal	with	objections	to	
the	pragmatic	approach	(§4).	
1. The	Problem	
Many	think	that	knowledge	is	the	norm	of	both	assertion	and	action:	
ASSERTION:	S	knows	p	iff	S	is	in	a	strong	enough	epistemic	position	to	assert	p.2	
ACTION:	S	knows	p	iff	it’s	appropriate	for	S	to	treat	p	as	a	reason	for	acting	
(Hawthorne	&	Stanley	2008).	
The	perspectivalist	has	to	modify	ASSERTION	and	ACTION	to	make	reference	to	perspectives.	
But	whose	perspective?	Imagine	Sarah	is	deciding	whether	to	go	into	the	bank	to	cash	
her	check	now	or	come	back	tomorrow	(Saturday).3	The	lines	are	very	long	and	it	is	clear	
there	will	be	a	long	wait.	There’s	no	rush	to	cash	the	check,	and	Sarah	has	good	evidence	
that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow	(she	remembers	it	being	open	on	previous	Saturdays).	
Sarah	decides	to	come	back	tomorrow.	Now	imagine	that	Hannah	is	also	deciding	
whether	to	go	in	to	cash	her	check	or	come	back	tomorrow.	While	Hannah	has	the	same	
evidence	as	Sarah,	it	is	imperative	that	Hannah	cashes	her	check	before	Monday.	
Hannah	goes	in	to	cash	her	check.		
According	to	the	perspectivalist,	Sarah	and	Hannah	both	“know”	relative	to	Sarah’s	
perspective,	but	neither	“know”	relative	to	Hannah’s	perspective.	But	whether	it	would	
be	proper	for	Sarah	to	assert	that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	or	treat	the	proposition	
that	the	bank	is	open	as	a	reason	for	acting,	seems	to	depend	on	Sarah’s	perspective,	
not	Hannah’s.	That	it	is	imperative	that	Hannah	cashes	her	check	doesn’t	affect	whether	
                                                
1	Contra	Brown	(2008;	2010)	we	assume	there	are	such	ties.	
2	Williamson	(2000:	Ch.	11)	defends	the	necessity	but	not	the	sufficiency	direction	of	this	
biconditional.	We’ll	use	the	biconditional	version	for	the	sake	of	simplicity.	
3	For	this	case	see	DeRose	(2009:	Ch.	1).	
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Sarah	can	properly	assert	or	act.	Thus,	the	perspectivalist	seems	forced	to	accept	the	
following	(DeRose	2009:	99,	263):	
ASSERTION*:	“S	knows	p”	is	true	at	time	t	and	S’s	perspective	i	iff	S	is	in	a	strong	
enough	epistemic	position	to	assert	p	at	t.	
ACTION*:	“S	knows	p”	is	true	at	time	t	and	S’s	perspective	i	iff	it’s	appropriate	for	S	to	
treat	p	as	a	reason	for	acting	at	t.	
Consequently,	the	following	may	be	true	(Hawthorne	2004:	85-91):	
(1)	Hannah:	“Sarah	doesn't	know	the	bank	is	open,	but	she’s	in	a	strong	enough	
epistemic	position	to	properly	assert	that	the	bank	is	open.”	
(2)	Sarah:	“Hannah	knows	the	bank	is	open,	but	she	isn't	in	a	strong	enough	
epistemic	position	to	properly	assert	that	the	bank	is	open.”	
(3)	Hannah:	“Sarah	doesn't	know	the	bank	is	open,	but	it’s	appropriate	for	her	to	
treat	the	proposition	that	the	bank	is	open	as	a	reason	for	acting.”	
(4)	Sarah:	“Hannah	knows	the	bank	is	open,	but	it	isn’t	appropriate	for	her	to	
treat	the	proposition	that	the	bank	is	open	as	a	reason	for	acting.”		
Each	of	(1)-(4)	have	two	components:	first,	a	knowledge	ascription	or	denial;	and	
second,	an	assessment	of	whether	a	subject	is	in	a	strong	enough	epistemic	position	to	
assert	or	act.	We’ll	call	the	first	component	the	‘knowledge	component’	and	the	second	
the	‘assertion/action	component’.	The	perspectivalist	allows	that	the	truth-values	of	
these	components	can	be	indexed	to	different	perspectives.	Thus,	she	has	to	accept	that	
(1)-(4)	may	be	true.		
At	this	point	it	is	important	to	clarify	how	we	understand	the	problem	for	the	
perspectivalist.	In	our	view,	the	problem	is	not	quite	that	(1)-(4)	are	inconsistent	with	
the	knowledge	norms	of	assertion	and	action.	The	perspectivalist	clearly	cannot	accept	
ASSERTION	and	ACTION	as	stated	because	they	implicitly	assume	that	perspectivalism	is	
false.	(Maybe	it	is	false,	but	we	can’t	just	build	that	in	to	our	chosen	norms	of	assertion	
and	action!)	It	is	not	necessarily	a	problem	for	the	perspectivalist	that	she	licenses	
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constructions	that	are	inconsistent	with	ASSERTION	and	ACTION.	At	the	same	time,	the	
perspectivalist—at	least	if	she	wants	to	respect	the	strength	of	the	case	for	the	
knowledge	norms	of	assertion	and	action—needs	to	find	a	viable	perspectivalist	
alternative	that	accommodates	as	much	of	the	linguistic	data	supporting	the	knowledge	
norms	as	possible.	Some	perspectivalists—like	Keith	DeRose—think	that	ASSERTION*	and	
ACTION*	are	the	most	promising	candidates.	The	problem,	though,	is	that	ASSERTION*	and	
ACTION*	license	claims	like	(1)-(4),	which	are	intuitively	very	odd.	As	we	see	it,	the	task	for	
the	perspectivalist	is	to	explain	this	oddness.	
Broadly	speaking,	there	are	two	approaches	that	the	perspectivalist	might	take	here.	
First,	she	could	argue	that	(1)-(4)	are	actually	false	(the	‘semantic’	approach).	Second,	
she	could	argue	that,	while	(1)-(4)	may	strictly	speaking	be	true,	they	could	never	be	
properly	asserted	(the	‘pragmatic’	approach).	We	will	argue	that,	while	the	
perspectivalist	will	struggle	to	make	good	on	the	semantic	approach,	there	is	a	viable	
version	of	the	pragmatic	approach	available.	On	the	version	of	the	pragmatic	approach	
we	propose,	knowledge	ascriptions	serve	the	function	of	identifying	good	informants,	
and	(1)-(4)	can	only	perform	this	function	if	the	truth-values	of	both	the	knowledge	and	
assertion/action	components	are	indexed	to	a	single	perspective.	But	since	the	truth-
values	of	both	components	aren’t	indexed	to	a	single	perspective	in	(1)-(4),	they	are	
unable	to	perform	their	function.	Consequently,	they	could	never	be	properly	asserted.		
We’ll	start	by	outlining	the	semantic	approach	and	explaining	why	we	think	it	will	
struggle	to	deal	with	the	problem.	We’ll	then	turn	to	the	pragmatic	approach.	We	finish	
by	discussing	several	objections	to	our	chosen	version	of	it.	
2. 	Perspectival	Flexibility	
Perspectivalists	think	that	the	truth-values	of	knowledge	ascriptions	are	indexed	to	
perspectives,	but	they	allow	that	speakers	and	assessors	may	have	purposes	that	lead	
them	to	adopt	the	subject’s	perspective	as	their	own.	We’ll	call	this	‘perspectival	
flexibility’.	Several	authors	have	suggested	this	idea.	John	Greco	writes:	
If	we	are	considering	whether	we	should	go	to	the	bank	sooner	rather	than	later,	
then	it	makes	sense	to	consider	what	S	knows	relative	to	our	needs	and	interests.	
But	if	we	are	considering	whether	S	should	go	to	the	bank	sooner	rather	than	later,	
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then	it	makes	sense	to	consider	whether	S	knows	relative	to	his	needs	and	interests.	
(2008:	425)	
If	Sarah	were	helping	Hannah	decide	whether	to	go	into	the	bank	to	deposit	a	check,	we	
would	expect	Sarah	to	adopt	Hannah’s	perspective	as	her	own.	If	she	does,	Sarah	will	
decide	that	Hannah	doesn’t	“know”	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow.	The	truth-value	of	
Sarah’s	knowledge	ascription	will	be	indexed	to	Hannah’s	perspective.	
Because	of	perspectival	flexibility,	the	perspectivalist	can	argue	that	the	truth-values	of	
the	knowledge	and	assertion/action	components	need	not	be	indexed	to	different	
perspectives.	In	the	situation	described	above,	Sarah	would	say	the	following:	
(5)	Hannah	doesn’t	know	that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	and	it	isn’t	
appropriate	for	her	to	assert	that	it	is	open	tomorrow	or	treat	the	proposition	
that	it	is	open	tomorrow	as	a	reason	for	acting.	
In	(5)	the	truth-values	of	both	the	knowledge	and	assertion/action	components	are	
indexed	to	a	single	perspective,	viz.	Hannah’s.	So,	due	to	perspectival	flexibility,	there	
will	be	instances	of	(2)	and	(4)	where	the	truth-values	of	both	components	are	indexed	
to	a	single	perspective,	viz.	the	subject’s.	The	upshot	is	that	the	relevant	instances	are	
false.	Much	the	same	approach	will	work	for	(1)	and	(3).		
The	problem	is	that	the	appeal	to	perspectival	flexibility	only	limits	the	scope	of	the	
problem.	While	speakers	and	assessors	can	adopt	the	subject’s	perspective	as	their	own,	
nothing	forces	speakers	and	assessors	to	adopt	the	subject’s	perspective	as	their	own.	
Imagine	that	Sarah	is	in	no	position	to	help	Hannah	get	her	check	cashed,	and	is	just	
offering	a	dispassionate	evaluation	of	Hannah’s	situation.	Since	Sarah	can’t	help,	it	is	
hard	to	see	why	she	would	adopt	Hannah’s	perspective	as	her	own	or	feel	under	any	
pressure	to	do	so.	In	this	sort	of	case,	Sarah	could	truly	say	the	following:	
(6)	Hannah	knows	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	but	it	isn’t	appropriate	for	her	to	
assert	that	it	is	open	tomorrow,	or	treat	the	proposition	that	it	is	open	tomorrow	
as	a	reason	for	acting,	because	it’s	very	important	to	her	that	it	is	open.	
The	perspectivalist	can’t	explain	why	(6)	sounds	odd	by	appeal	to	perspectival	flexibility.		
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Let’s	consider	another	way	in	which	the	perspectivalist	might	try	to	defend	the	semantic	
approach.4	In	“Contextualism	and	Knowledge	Norms”,	Alex	Worsnip	(2017)	considers	
the	following	relativized	version	of	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion:		
KNA-RELATIVIZED:	S	(epistemically)	may	assert	p	iff	in	S’s	conversational	context,	the	
utterance	“I	know	p”	would	be	true.		
This	still	leads	to	sentences	that	sound	odd.	For	example,	if	we	suppose	that	the	subject	
is	in	a	high-standards	context	but	the	ascriber	is	in	a	low-standards	context,	then	“I	
know	p”	is	false	in	the	subject’s	mouth,	and	so,	by	the	aforementioned	relativized	
standard,	S	is	not	epistemically	permitted	to	assert	p.	But	since	“S	knows	p”	is	true	in	the	
ascriber’s	context,	it	should	be	true	for	her	to	say	“S	knows	p,	but	S	may	not	assert	p”.	
That	sounds	odd.		
According	to	Worsnip,	however,	the	contextualist	may	reply	by	utilizing	a	“doubly-
relativized”	version	of	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion,	which	DeRose	calls	“KAA-R2”	
(2009:	260):		
KNA-DOUBLY-RELATIVIZED:	An	utterance	of	“S	(epistemically)	may	assert	p”	in	a	
context	C	is	true	iff	the	utterance	“S	knows	p”	in	context	C	is	true.			
On	this	version	of	the	principle,	the	problematic	knowledge	ascriptions	plausibly	come	
out	false.	By	relativizing	both	sides	of	the	bi-conditional,	Worsnip	brings	third-person	
evaluations	of	the	permissibility	of	assertions	and	third-person	knowledge	attributions	
back	together.	Thus	it	can	never	be	true	to	say	“S	knows	p,	but	S	may	not	assert	p”,	
assuming	there	is	no	shift	in	context	during	the	course	of	the	utterance.		
As	Worsnip	admits,	accepting	KNA-DOUBLY-RELATIVIZED	commits	the	contextualist	to	
claiming	that	the	semantic	value	of	“may”	can	vary	with	the	conversational	context	of	
the	speaker.	While	Hawthorne	(2004:	86)	seems	to	think	this	is	a	problem,	as	Worsnip	
notes,	it	is	(or	is	at	least	arguably)	semantic	orthodoxy	that	the	semantic	values	of	
deontic	modals	depend	on	the	context	of	utterance	(Dowell	2013;	Kratzer	1981).	So,	
contra	Hawthorne,	there	is	no	immediate	problem	with	KNA-DOUBLY-RELATIVIZED.	
                                                
4	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	urging	us	to	consider	this	alternative.	
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However,	as	Worsnip	goes	on	to	note,	the	contextualist	who	accepts	KNA-DOUBLY-
RELATIVIZED	is	committed	to	more	than	just	the	bare	claim	that	the	semantic	values	of	
deontic	modals	depend	on	the	context	of	utterance.	She	is	committed	to	the	view	that	
the	semantic	values	of	deontic	modals	can	depend	on	the	epistemic	standards	that	are	
operative	in	the	ascriber’s	context.	Is	this	a	problem?	Worsnip	is	inclined	to	think	not:	
I	do	not	think	this	is	obviously	fatal.	What	unintuitiveness	there	may	appear	to	
be	here	can	be	further	cushioned	by	a	move	that	the	contextualist	makes	in	
numerous	other	contexts:	namely	to	insist	that	the	standards	that	govern	a	
conversational	context	are	not	mechanically	determined	by	what	is	practically	at	
stake	for	the	speaker.	Rather,	often,	the	interests	and	practical	situation	of	the	
subject	can	be	salient	(perhaps	via	their	being	salient	to	the	speaker,	and	part	of	
what	she	intends	to	talk	with	reference	to).	In	contexts	where	she	is	talking	
about	what	the	subject	may	assert	or	rely	on,	she	will	plausibly	often	be	
implicitly	talking	about	what,	from	the	subject’s	perspective,	the	subject	may	
assert	or	rely	on.	In	doing	so,	she	may	shift	the	contextually	relevant	value	of	
‘knows’.	KNA-Doubly-Relativized	allows	for	this	(2017:	182).	
But	this	means	that	the	defender	of	KNA-DOUBLY-RELATIVIZED	is	in	a	similar	position	to	the	
contextualist	who	appeals	to	perspectival	flexibility.	While	ascribers	can	adopt	the	
subject’s	perspective	as	their	own,	nothing	forces	them	to	do	this.	Thus,	if	we	return	to	
an	earlier	example,	we	have	a	subject	(Hannah)	in	a	high-standards	context,	and	an	
ascriber	(Sarah)	in	a	low-standards	context.	As	before,	imagine	that	Sarah	is	in	no	
position	to	help	Hannah	get	her	check	cashed,	and	is	just	offering	a	dispassionate	
evaluation	of	Hannah’s	situation.	Since	Sarah	can’t	help,	it	is	hard	to	see	why	she	would	
adopt	Hannah’s	perspective	as	her	own	or	feel	under	any	pressure	to	do	so.	In	this	sort	
of	case,	Sarah	presumably	could	truly	say:	
	 (7)	Hannah	knows	that	the	bank	is	open,	and	she	may	assert	that	it	is	open.	
While	the	problem	is	no	longer	one	of	divorcing	assessments	of	knowledge	and	
assessments	of	what	a	subject	may	or	may	not	assert,	we	would	submit	that	it	is	
counter-intuitive	that	Sarah	could	truly	say	that	Hannah	may	assert	that	the	bank	is	
open.	Perhaps	this	isn’t	a	fatal	objection.	But	in	the	rest	of	this	paper	we	want	to	explore	
8	
	
the	plausibility	of	the	pragmatic	approach	instead	of	attempting	to	make	good	on	the	
semantic	approach.		
3. Perspectival	Unity	
A	recent	trend	in	epistemology	has	been	to	focus	on	the	functions	or	roles	of	knowledge	
ascriptions	in	our	socio-linguistic	interactions.	The	guiding	idea	is	that	putative	facts	
about	the	functions	of	knowledge	ascriptions	serve	as	evidence	for	epistemological	
theory.	We	think	this	research	program	shows	promise.	In	the	remainder	of	this	paper	
we	will	appeal	to	the	functions	of	knowledge	ascriptions	to	show	how	perspectivalists	
can	deal	with	(1)-(4),	and	preserve	the	links	between	knowledge,	assertion,	and	action.		
While	knowledge	ascriptions	plausibly	serve	a	range	of	functions,	the	two	most	popular	
and	plausible	are	(a)	to	identify	good	or	reliable	informants	(Craig	1990)	and	(b)	to	
indicate	when	an	inquirer	can	reasonably	terminate	inquiry	(Kelp	2011;	Rysiew	2012).5	
These	two	functions	may	look	distinct,	and	some	people	have	argued	that	they	are	
incompatible	(e.g.	Kelp	2011	and	Rysiew	2012),	but	we	think	they	are	two	sides	of	the	
same	coin.	One	common	way	to	reasonably	terminate	inquiry	is	by	identifying	a	
sufficiently	reliable	informant	who	has	the	information	one	needs.	Attributing	
knowledge	to	someone	is	a	way	of	expressing	the	attitude	that	someone’s	epistemic	
position	(with	respect	to	a	given	proposition)	is	good	enough	to	stop	further	inquiry.	
That’s	precisely	what	makes	such	a	person	a	sufficiently	reliable	informant.	Accordingly,	
to	keep	things	simple	we’ll	limit	our	attention	to	the	function	of	identifying	reliable	
informants	in	what	follows.6	
As	shown	in	the	previous	section,	the	appeal	to	perspectival	flexibility	can	only	go	so	far:	
it	is	hard	to	see	how	the	perspectivalist	can	avoid	accepting	that	instances	of	(1)-(4)	can	
be	strictly	speaking	true.	But	the	conditions	under	which	a	sentence	is	true	are	not	
necessarily	the	same	as	the	conditions	under	which	it	can	be	properly	asserted.	It	seems	
plausible	that,	if	a	knowledge	ascription	has	the	function	of	identifying	the	subject	of	the	
                                                
5	Knowledge	ascriptions	might	serve	other	functions.	Our	assumption	is	that	identifying	reliable	
informants	and	terminating	inquiry	are	the	most	central	(common,	important)	ones.	(This	becomes	
important	below.	See	§4).	
6	What	do	we	mean	when	we	say	that	knowledge	ascriptions	have	this	function?	The	thought	is	that	
ascribing	knowledge	is	an	act,	and	we	perform	this	act	in	order	to	do	something,	viz.	identify	someone	
as	a	reliable	informant	on	some	matter	or	other.	Thus,	the	function	of	knowledge	ascriptions	is	a	
matter	of	their	pragmatics.	
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ascription	as	a	reliable	informant,	then	one	condition	for	the	ascription	to	be	proper	is	
that	it	serves	this	function.	While	there	are	no	doubt	many	conditions	that	have	to	be	
met	in	order	for	a	knowledge	ascription	to	perform	its	characteristic	function,	one	is	
what	we	call	‘perspectival	unity’.	The	basic	idea,	which	we’ll	develop	in	what	follows,	is	
that	knowledge	ascriptions	can	only	perform	their	characteristic	function	if	the	truth-
values	of	both	the	knowledge	and	the	assertion/action	components	are	indexed	to	a	
single	perspective.7	
Let’s	go	through	(1)-(4).	In	(1)-(4),	Sarah	employs	low	epistemic	standards	and	Hannah	
employs	high	epistemic	standards.	Take	(2)	and	(4)	first.	While	we	want	to	abstract	away	
from	particular	details,	we’ll	specify	that	what’s	at	issue	is	whether	Hannah	“knows”	
that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	and	that	Hannah	has	good	evidence	that	the	bank	is	
open	tomorrow.	If	Sarah	says	that	Hannah	“knows”	that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	she	
identifies	Hannah	as	a	reliable	informant	on	the	matter	of	whether	the	bank	is	open	
tomorrow.	Think	of	this	as	performing	a	public	service.	Other	people	might	need	this	
information,	and	by	‘flagging’	Hannah	as	someone	with	the	information	Sarah	tells	them	
where	they	can	get	it.	But	if	Sarah	simultaneously	says	that	Hannah	“knows”	and	denies	
that	Hannah	is	in	a	good	enough	epistemic	position	to	assert	that	the	bank	is	open	
tomorrow,	or	to	treat	the	proposition	that	the	bank	is	open	as	a	reason	for	acting,	that	
casts	doubt	on	whether	Hannah	is	a	reliable	informant.	Sarah	is	sending	a	mixed	
message,	since	saying	that	Hannah	is	not	in	a	position	to	assert	or	act	immediately	casts	
doubt	on	whether	Hannah	is	in	fact	a	reliable	informant.	Upon	hearing	what	Sarah	said,	
one	wonders	why	Sarah	is	identifying	Hannah	as	a	reliable	informant	(a	“knower”)	given	
that	she	can’t	properly	assert	or	act.	This	renders	Sarah’s	knowledge	ascription	
incapable	of	performing	its	function.	Consequently,	Sarah	can’t	properly	assert	(2)	or	(4).	
Turning	to	cases	(1)	and	(3),	we’ll	specify	that	what’s	at	issue	is	whether	Sarah	“knows”	
that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	and	that	Sarah	has	good	evidence	that	the	bank	is	open	
tomorrow.	If	Hannah	denies	that	Sarah	“knows”,	she	signals	that	Sarah	is	not	a	
                                                
7	Notice	that	we	say	a	‘single’	perspective	rather	than	the	subject’s	perspective.	Our	view	is	that	
whether	a	subject	can	properly	assert	or	act	usually	depends	on	her	perspective,	but	there	are	cases	
where	it	depends	on	some	other	perspective.	Imagine	a	case	where	Hannah	approaches	Sarah	to	ask	
whether	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow.	Once	Sarah	is	aware	that	it	is	imperative	that	Hannah	get	her	
check	cashed,	it	would	be	improper	for	her	to	assert	that	it	is	open	tomorrow	based	on	even	very	
good	evidence.	
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sufficiently	reliable	informant	on	the	matter	of	whether	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow.	
Again,	in	doing	so	she	is	performing	a	sort	of	public	service.	Others	around	Hannah	
might	need	reliable	information,	and	in	not	identifying	Sarah	as	someone	who	has	it	
Hannah	is	suggesting	that	they	can’t	get	it	from	Sarah.	But	if	Hannah	simultaneously	
denies	that	Sarah	“knows”	and	says	that	Sarah	is	in	a	good	enough	epistemic	position	to	
assert	that	the	bank	is	open	tomorrow,	or	to	treat	the	proposition	that	the	bank	is	open	
as	a	reason	for	acting,	that	casts	doubt	on	why	Sarah	isn’t	a	sufficiently	reliable	
informant.	Upon	hearing	what	Hannah	said,	one	wonders	why	Hannah	is	denying	that	
Sarah	is	a	reliable	informant,	given	that	she	can	properly	assert	and	act.	Again,	this	
renders	Hannah’s	knowledge	ascription	incapable	of	performing	its	characteristic	
function.	Consequently,	Hannah	can’t	properly	assert	(1)	or	(3).	
In	summary,	we	have	argued	that	knowledge	ascriptions	have	the	characteristic	function	
of	identifying	reliable	informants.	In	order	to	serve	this	function,	however,	knowledge	
ascriptions	need	to	exhibit	what	we	called	perspectival	unity:	one	can’t—as	(1)-(4)	do—
index	a	knowledge	ascription	to	one	perspective,	while	indexing	an	assessment	of	
whether	the	subject	can	properly	assert	or	act	to	another,	without	violating	the	
requirement	of	perspectival	unity.	
4. Objections	and	Replies		
We	finish	by	considering	some	objections	to	the	pragmatic	approach.	
First	objection:	The	view	that	“knows”	flags	reliable	informants	does	not	cohere	
particularly	well	with	the	perspectivalist	view	we	want	to	defend.	One	way	of	putting	
the	worry	is	as	follows.	If	the	semantics	of	“knows”	is	perspectival,	then	how	can	it	be	
that	“knows”	flags	reliable	informants?	At	best	it	flags	informants	that	are	reliable	
enough	relative	to	a	perspective.	But	if	the	semantics	really	are	this	complicated,	then	
“knows”	isn’t	suited	for	identifying	reliable	informants	in	the	first	place.		
We	take	this	objection	seriously,	and	one	of	us	has	dealt	with	it	at	length	in	another	
work	(Hannon	2013).	Put	roughly,	the	response	is	as	follows.	If	one	could	combine	the	
view	that	“knows”	flags	reliable	informants	with	perspectivalism,	one	would	provide	
motivation	for	a	sort	of	perspectivalism	on	which	there	is	a	‘default’	epistemic	standard	
that	is	operative	in	a	wide	range	of	contexts.	This	default	standard	is	such	that	any	
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subject	who	meets	it	with	respect	to	a	proposition	p	is	a	reliable	informant	on	the	
matter	of	p	for	many	people	with	diverse	interests	and	purposes.	The	combination	is	
well	motivated	because	there	are	certain	cases	–	i.e.	cases	where	speakers	and	
assessors	are	in	unusually	pressing	practical	situations	–	in	which	some	standard	other	
than	the	default	will	be	operative.	In	such	cases,	we	need	a	standard	that	is	more	fitting	
to	the	particular	practical	situation.	This	gives	us	a	picture	on	which	knowledge	
ascriptions	are	stable	enough	to	serve	their	function,	yet	there	is	still	room	for	
perspectival	variation	in	the	truth-values	of	knowledge	ascriptions.8		
Second	objection:	On	our	view,	“knowledge”	has	the	characteristic	function	of	
identifying	reliable	informants.	So	why	not	identify	knowledge	with	the	state	of	being	a	
sufficiently	reliable	informant?	What	motivation	is	there	for	the	perspectivalist	
approach?		
We	have	two	replies	to	this	objection.	First,	the	characteristic	function	of	knowledge	
ascriptions	might	lead	one	to	identify	knowledge	with	the	state	of	being	a	sufficiently	
reliable	informant,	but	we	want	to	remain	neutral	on	that	issue.	Our	goal	is	to	show	that	
a	characteristic	function	of	knowledge	ascriptions	can	solve	a	problem	for	
perspectivalism,	not	to	discuss	the	metaphysics	of	knowledge.		
Second,	it	would	be	far	too	quick	to	just	identify	knowing	with	being	a	reliable	
informant.	One	reason	is	that	while	identifying	reliable	informants	is	a	central	function	
of	knowledge	ascriptions,	it	may	not	apply	to	every	single	case	in	which	knowledge	is	
ascribed.	For	example,	consider	the	case	of	Robinson	Crusoe	(or,	if	you	prefer,	someone	
stranded	on	an	island	from	birth).	Robinson	Crusoe	knew	any	number	of	things	(e.g.	that	
he	could	eat	certain	fruits)	but	he	wasn’t	much	good	as	an	informant.	Or,	to	take	
another	example,	consider	the	mafia	boss.	She	knows	a	number	of	things	about	illegal	
mafia	activity,	but	she	isn’t	much	use	as	an	informant	because	she	isn’t	inclined	to	talk	
                                                
8	This	allows	us	to	reply	to	another	objection.	You	might	worry	that	by	combining	shifty	“knowledge”	
views	with	the	idea	that	knowledge	ascriptions	function	to	identify	reliable	informants,	we	require	
asserters	to	check	what	is	at	stake	for	the	person	to	whom	they	are	recommending	an	informant.	This	
would	be	a	problem	because	our	actual	practices	clearly	do	not	call	for	this.	But,	as	above,	we	think	
the	most	plausible	shifty	views	index	most	(but	not	all)	knowledge	ascriptions	to	a	‘default’	epistemic	
standard.		
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to	the	police.	So,	while	we	are	officially	neutral	on	the	metaphysics,	we	don’t	think	you	
can	just	equate	knowing	with	being	a	reliable	informant	without	further	argument.	
Third	objection:	The	idea	behind	the	pragmatic	approach	is	that,	while	(1)-(4)	may	
strictly	speaking	be	true,	they	could	never	be	properly	asserted.	But	if	we	accept	a	
perspectivalist	variant	of	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion,	then	(1)-(4)	will	be	properly	
asserted	just	in	case	they	are	known.	Unless	we	deny	that	anyone	can	ever	know	(1)-(4),	
the	pragmatic	approach	is	doomed	to	fail.	
This	is	a	good	point,	but	it	isn’t	damaging	to	us.	Defenders	of	the	knowledge	norm	of	
assertion	do	not	(or	at	least	should	not)	claim	that	any	assertion	that	satisfies	the	
knowledge	norm	is	thereby	proper	all-things-considered	or	simpliciter.	For	example,	
consider	someone	who	has	hidden	some	fugitives	in	the	basement	in	order	to	help	them	
evade	enemy	soldiers.	If	the	enemy	knocks	on	her	door	and	asks	where	the	fugitives	are,	
it	would	be	improper	all-things-considered	for	her	to	assert	that	the	fugitives	are	in	the	
basement,	even	though	she	knows	that	they	are.	Indeed,	it	would	be	entirely	proper	all-
things-considered	for	her	to	assert	that	she	has	no	idea	where	the	fugitives	are.	Such	
cases	don’t	tell	against	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion	because	it	isn’t	a	norm	that	
tells	us	the	conditions	an	assertion	has	to	meet	in	order	to	be	proper	all-things-
considered.	So	when	we	say	that	on	our	view	no	assertion	of	(1)-(4)	could	be	proper,	we	
mean	proper	all-things-considered,	not	proper	so	far	as	the	knowledge	norm	of	
assertion	goes.	
Fourth	objection:	Take	case	(2).	We	have	said	that	Sarah	cannot	properly	assert	“Hannah	
knows	the	bank	is	open,	but	it	isn’t	appropriate	for	her	to	assert	that	it	is	open”.	Put	
roughly,	this	is	because	no	assertion	of	(2)	could	serve	to	identify	Hannah	as	a	reliable	
informant,	since	whether	Hannah	is	a	reliable	informant	is	instantly	cast	into	doubt	by	
Sarah’s	claim	that	Hannah	can’t	appropriately	assert.	But	why	does	noting	that	Hannah	
can’t	appropriately	assert	cast	doubt	on	whether	she	is	a	reliable	informant?	Let’s	
imagine,	first,	that	Sarah	and	her	audience	are	fully	aware	that	Hannah	is	in	an	unusually	
pressing	practical	situation;	second,	that	Sarah	and	her	audience	are	not	in	a	high	stakes	
situation;	and	third,	that	they	are	interested	in	whether	the	bank	is	open	on	Saturday,	
and	so	in	whether	Hannah	is	a	good	informant	as	to	whether	it	is	open.	In	this	case,	why	
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would	it	cast	doubt	on	Hannah’s	reliability	as	an	informant	if	Sarah	were	to	note	that	
Hannah	couldn’t	properly	assert	that	the	bank	is	open?		
The	term	“knowledge”	plays	a	complex	role	in	folk	epistemological	practices.	On	our	
hypothesis,	“knowledge”	is	characteristically	used	to	identify	reliable	informants	to	an	
audience.	Moreover,	there	is	a	strong	intuitive	connection	between	appropriate	
assertion	and	“knowledge”.	Thus,	if	Sarah	says	that	it	isn’t	appropriate	for	Hannah	to	
assert	that	the	bank	is	open,	a	natural	way	to	hear	this	criticism	is	that	Hannah	wasn’t	
reliable	enough	to	assert	this.	This	isn’t	to	say	that	Hannah	is	in	fact	not	reliable	enough	
for	Sarah’s	purposes.	If,	as	we	are	imagining,	the	stakes	are	low	for	Sarah,	then	Hannah’s	
information	may	be	good	enough	for	Sarah,	even	though	Hannah	can’t	properly	assert	
or	act	on	that	information	herself.	Nevertheless,	given	the	tight	connection	between	
assertion	and	reliability	in	our	epistemic	evaluations,	it	is	not	surprising	that	to	deny	that	
someone	may	properly	assert	p	casts	doubt	on	their	reliability	as	an	informant	on	
whether	p.	An	intuitive	connection	between	assertion	and	reliability	is	broken.		
Thus,	strictly	speaking,	we	hold	that,	while	there	are	good	reasons	why	Sarah’s	assertion	
that	Hannah	knows	but	can’t	assert	that	the	bank	will	be	open	sounds	odd,	this	reaction	
is	based	on	a	mistake.	The	assertion	sounds	odd	because	we	take	it	that,	if	Sarah	can’t	
assert	some	proposition,	then	she	can’t	be	a	reliable	informant	with	respect	to	this	
proposition.	But	this	is	wrong.	It	could	be	that	Sarah	is	reliable	enough	for	our	purposes,	
but	not	for	her	own.9		
We	hold	that	part	of	the	reason	why	(1)-(4)	strike	us	as	so	odd	is	a	sort	of	ignorance.	But	
this	ignorance	is	a	little	different	from	the	sort	of	ignorance	commonly	posited	by	
contextualists	(see	DeRose	2009:	Ch.	6).	Contextualists	tend	to	emphasise	that	we	are	
ignorant	of	the	context-sensitivity	of	the	word	“knows”	and	its	cognates.	But	the	sort	of	
ignorance	we	have	in	mind	isn’t	about	the	context-sensitivity	of	the	word	“knows”.	On	
our	view,	following	Edward	Craig,	knowledge	ascriptions	serve	the	purpose	of	identifying	
reliable	informants.	The	basic	idea	is	that	the	central	reason	why	we	have	a	practice	of	
ascribing	knowledge	to	others	is	in	order	to	meet	a	basic	need	that	we	have	to	identify	
reliable	sources	of	information.	Given	this,	it	is	no	surprise	that,	when	we	hear	someone	
                                                
9	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	urging	us	to	clarify	this	aspect	of	our	view.	
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saying	something	that	seems	to	cast	doubt	the	reliability	of	a	potential	informant,	we	
take	this	to	mean	that	they	are	in	fact	not	a	reliable	informant.	But—as	we	will	discuss	
below—knowledge	ascriptions	can	sometimes	serve	other	functions	besides	identifying	
good	informants.	When	they	do	so,	we	are	mistaken	about	the	intent	of	the	knowledge	
ascription,	and	so	it	might	strike	us	as	odd	when	in	fact	it	makes	perfect	sense.	After	all,	
Hannah	is	a	reliable	informant,	even	though	she’s	not	in	a	strong	enough	epistemic	
position	to	assert	or	act.10	
Fifth	objection:	Take	case	(3).	Our	view	is	that	Hannah	cannot	properly	assert	“Sarah	
doesn’t	know	the	bank	is	open,	but	it	is	appropriate	for	her	to	act	on	the	basis	that	it	is	
open”.	Again,	this	is	because	no	assertion	of	(3)	could	serve	to	signal	that	Sarah	isn’t	a	
sufficiently	reliable	informant	(in	claiming	that	she	can	act,	Hannah	suggests	that	Sarah	
is	sufficiently	reliable	after	all).	But	why	doesn’t	Hannah’s	noting	that	Sarah	can	act	not	
just	cancel	any	implicature	that	Sarah	is	not	a	sufficiently	reliable	informant?	If	it	can,	
why	need	assertions	of	(3)	be	improper?	After	all,	there’s	nothing	improper	about	
cancelling	a	conversational	implicature.	More	generally,	we	have	accepted	that	there	
are	situations	where	knowledge	ascriptions	don’t	serve	their	characteristic	function	of	
identifying	reliable	informants.	In	such	situations,	wouldn’t	any	conversational	
implicature	that	the	subject	of	the	ascription	is	(or	isn’t)	a	reliable	informant	be	
cancelled,	and	so	our	explanation	of	the	oddity	of	claims	like	(1)-(4)	wouldn’t	go	
through?	
First,	let	us	just	register	that	the	‘cancellability	test’	for	conversational	implicatures	isn’t	
universally	accepted	(see,	for	instance,	Weiner	2006).	Second,	and	more	importantly,	it	
is	not	part	of	our	view	that	knowledge	ascriptions	conversationally	implicate	that	the	
subject	of	the	ascription	is	a	reliable	informant	or	that	knowledge	denials	implicate	that	
the	subject	isn’t	a	sufficiently	reliable	informant.	While	we	think	of	the	function	of	
“knows”	as	a	matter	of	the	pragmatics	of	knowledge	ascriptions,	not	all	pragmatics	
                                                
10	An	anonymous	reviewer	suggested	that,	on	our	view,	the	inference	from	“S	can’t	properly	assert	
that/act	on	p”	to	“S	isn’t	a	reliable	informant	about	p”	is	a	sort	of	“heuristic	proxy”.	While	the	
inference	generally	holds,	it	fails	in	certain	cases.	But	it	is	easily	explicable	why	we	make	it:	it	is	
cognitively	cheap.	Mikkel	Gerken	(2017)	defends	this	sort	of	view	of	the	knowledge	norms	
themselves,	so	while	our	view	is	perhaps	analogous	to	Gerken’s,	it	is	importantly	different	because	
we	are	not	committed	to	the	view	that	the	knowledge	norms	(or	rather	contextualised	versions	of	
them)	are	mere	heuristic	proxies.	
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concerns	conversational	implicature.	A	better	way	of	thinking	about	the	function	of	
“knows”	is	in	terms	of	the	illocutionary	force	of	knowledge	ascriptions	(recall	fn.	6).	To	
take	an	analogy,	a	central	function	of	“good”	claims	–	claims	of	the	form	“x	is	good”	–	is	
to	commend	or	otherwise	signal	approval	of	persons,	deeds	and	courses	of	action.	One	
way	of	thinking	of	this	is	in	terms	of	the	illocutionary	force	of	“good”	claims.	Put	roughly,	
in	saying	that	something	is	“good”	I	do	something,	viz.	commend	or	signal	approval	of	it.	
Similarly,	in	saying	that	S	“knows”	p	I	do	something,	viz.	identify	or	recommend	S	as	a	
reliable	informant	on	the	matter	of	p.		
Finally,	this	leaves	the	question	of	what	we	say	about	situations	where	knowledge	
ascriptions	don’t	serve	their	characteristic	functions.	Take	the	case	of	Robinson	Crusoe,	
but	ignore	the	part	of	the	story	where	he	makes	contact	with	other	humans.	Presumably	
Robinson	Crusoe	can	truly	be	said	to	know	certain	things;	e.g.	that	the	berries	in	the	
bush	are	edible.	But	it	seems	a	bit	of	a	stretch	to	say	that,	if	we	were	to	ascribe	
knowledge	to	Crusoe,	we	would	be	identifying	him	as	a	reliable	informant.	Who,	exactly,	
is	he	a	reliable	informant	for?	This	suggests	a	problem.	Imagine	a	situation	where	it	is	
imperative	for	Crusoe	that	he	not	make	a	mistake	about	whether	the	berries	he	has	
picked	are	poisonous	or	not.	He	has	eaten	berries	that	look	like	these	berries	before	and	
was	fine,	but	he’s	unsure.	It	seems	plausible	that,	by	the	perspectivalist’s	lights,	he	
doesn’t	“know”	that	the	berries	aren’t	poisonous	relative	to	the	standards	operative	in	
his	perspective,	and	so	cannot	assert	that	they	aren’t	poisonous	or	treat	the	proposition	
that	they	aren’t	poisonous	as	a	reason	for	acting	(e.g.	eating	them).	But,	equally,	it	
seems	plausible	that	he	does	“know”	that	they	aren’t	poisonous	relative	to	the	
standards	operative	in	other	perspectives—those	where	whether	the	berries	are	
poisonous	or	not	isn’t	a	pressing	practical	question.	So	the	following	seems	to	be	true	in	
this	perspective:	
(8)	Crusoe	knows	that	the	berries	aren’t	poisonous,	but	it	isn’t	appropriate	for	
him	to	assert	that	they	aren’t	poisonous,	or	treat	this	proposition	as	a	reason	for	
acting.	
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But	we	cannot	explain	the	oddness	of	(8)	in	terms	of	the	function	of	identifying	reliable	
informants	because—as	we	have	admitted—ascriptions	of	knowledge	to	Crusoe	don’t	
seem	to	serve	this	function.	
There	are	two	routes	that	we	might	take	in	response	to	this	objection.	Because	we	
aren’t	settled	on	which	route	to	take,	we	will	merely	outline	each	and	leave	it	up	to	the	
reader	to	decide	which	is	more	plausible.	First,	we	could	argue	that,	in	fact,	there	is	a	
sense	in	which	all	knowledge	ascriptions	serve	the	characteristic	function	of	identifying	
reliable	informants	(for	this	line	see	Hannon	2019;	2013;	McKenna	2013).	The	basic	idea	
would	be	that,	while	all	knowledge	ascriptions	serve	to	identify	reliable	informants,	they	
need	not	all	serve	to	identify	reliable	informants	for	the	present	audience.	To	take	a	
different	example,	consider	a	claim	like	“Galileo	knew	that	the	Earth	orbits	the	sun”.	This	
can’t	be	read	as	identifying	Galileo	as	a	reliable	informant	on	the	Earth’s	orbit	for	us;	
astronomy	has	gone	far	beyond	Galileo.	But	it	can	be	read	as	identifying	Galileo	as	a	
reliable	informant	on	the	Earth’s	orbit	for	a	past	audience.	Taken	this	way,	the	claim	
amounts	to	something	like	“In	1616,	Galileo	was	a	good	informant	about	whether	the	
Earth	orbits	the	sun”.	
Can	something	similar	work	with	the	Crusoe	case?	We	think	that	it	can.	We	can	read	a	
claim	like	“Crusoe	knows	that	the	berries	aren’t	poisonous”	as	identifying	him	as	a	
reliable	informant	for	a	hypothetical	audience.	We	can	then	give	a	similar	explanation	of	
the	oddness	of	(8)	to	that	given	of	(1)-(4).	The	problem	with	(8)	is	that	it	sends	out	a	
mixed	signal	to	this	same	hypothetical	audience.	On	the	one	hand,	it	identifies	Crusoe	as	
a	reliable	informant	for	the	hypothetical	audience;	on	the	other,	it	casts	doubt	on	his	
reliability.	
The	second	route	is	to	reiterate	a	point	we	made	in	response	to	the	fourth	objection.	
Our	practice	of	knowledge	ascription	gains	its	point	and	purpose	in	a	particular	social	
context:	the	identification	of	reliable	informants.	This	means	that,	when	we	consider	
knowledge	ascriptions	in	rather	different	social	contexts—such	as	the	context	of	a	lone	
individual	who	is	in	no	position	to	be	an	informant	for	anyone—our	intuitions	can	be	
regarded	as	less	probative.	Maybe	(8)	does	strike	us	as	odd.	But	given	how	unusual	the	
context	is,	does	this	much	matter?	
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5. Concluding	Remarks	
A	common	objection	to	both	contextualism	and	relativism	is	that	they	threaten	the	ties	
between	knowledge,	assertion,	and	action.	As	we	have	seen,	the	problem	is	not	that	
defenders	of	these	views	can’t	defend	versions	of	the	knowledge	norms	of	assertion	and	
action.	Rather,	the	problem	is	that	they	are	unable	to	explain	the	oddity	of	(1)-(4).	But,	
as	we	have	argued,	while	instances	of	(1)-(4)	may	be	true,	they	could	never	be	properly	
asserted.	We	take	this	to	show	that,	as	far	as	contextualism	and	relativism	are	
concerned,	the	ties	remain	in	place.11	
                                                
11		Thanks	to	several	anonymous	referees,	Davide	Fassio,	and	Nick	Hughes	for	their	comments	on	
earlier	versions	of	this	paper.		
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